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In Gibbs v. Babbitt, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Endangered
Species Act's take provision against a Commerce Clause
challenge. The court found that federal regulation of the take of
red wolves on private land was consistent with the precedents set
by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison and
described a range of ways in which endangered species may be
connected to interstate commerce. While connections between
wolves and commerce were particularly strong, Gibbs, in
combination with several other similar cases, may signal that
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INTRODUCTION
Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez,' numerous commentators speculated that the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) "take" provision 2 might stand on
shaky ground.3 Lopez signaled the Court's renewed willingness
to narrowly interpret the scope of Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause4 and indicated that protection of endangered
species on private lands might be beyond the power of the
federal government. In Gibbs v. Babbitt,5 however, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the application of the ESA "take" provision in the
face of a Commerce Clause challenge. Addressing the
constitutionality of regulations preventing taking of red wolves,
the court applied the precedents set forth in Lopez and affirmed
in United States v. Morrison,6  but nevertheless held that
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
prohibited possession of a handgun within 1,000 feet of a school, was an
unconstitutional overextension of Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerce).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (making it "unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to... take any such species within the United
States or the territorial sea of the United States"). Under the ESA, the term "take"
means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
3. See, e.g., Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A
Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000); David A. Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the
Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and
Wetlands Regulation. 2 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 365 (1998): Gavin R. Villareal, One Leg to
Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species
Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1125 (1998).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several states and with the Indian Tribes").
Despite this modest language, the Commerce Clause is the source of Congressional
power for much modem regulation, including many environmental regulations.
5. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub norm. Gibbs v. Norton, 121 S.
Ct. 1081 (2001).
6. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act, which
allowed a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded
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protecting wolves on private land was within the federal
Commerce Clause power. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit
signaled that the ESA might survive the Supreme Court's re-
interpretation of the constitutional Commerce Clause.The holding in Gibbs is important on two levels. First, it
indicates that even a relatively conservative circuit is willing to
apply a less-than-revolutionary version of Lopez to the ESA.
Second, Gibbs builds on a developing line of cases that recognize
broad and significant connections between endangered species
and commerce. Particularly strong facts may prevent Gibbs alone
from establishing any general legal principle, but the numerous
acknowledged connections between endangered species and
commercial activity may have value as precedent in future
Commerce Clause challenges to endangered species protection.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Red Wolf
The red wolf originally inhabited the southeastern United
States, from Texas north to Illinois and east to the Atlantic
coast.7 Historical evidence suggests that the wolf was common in
bottomlands and riverine habitats." The incursions of people
upon these habitats, through draining, inundation, and direct
efforts at predator control, nearly extirpated the wolf.' In 1967,
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") listed the
species as endangered.10 By the mid-1970s, only one small
population, living in southwest Louisiana and southeast Texas,
survived." In an effort to preserve the species and eventually
facilitate its reintroduction into the wild, FWS trapped the
survivors and placed them in a captive breeding program.12
Captive breeding proved successful. Consequently, in 1987,
FWS released four pairs of red wolves into North Carolina's
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and was therefore
unconstitutional).
7. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in North




10. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531. 532 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 1998).




Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge.'3 Over the next six years,
FWS released a total of forty-two wolves. 4  The wolves
repopulated the refuge, but also wandered onto surrounding
private lands. 5 In 2000, the Forest Service estimated that
between seventy and eighty wolves survived in the wild. 6
FWS designated the released wolves as an experimental,
non-essential population; meaning that the wolves received less
protection than would an existing endangered population.7 FWS
selected this lesser level of protection hoping that retaining
flexibility in its ability to manage the reintroduced population
would ease the concerns of local citizens and other agencies.
Nevertheless, FWS regulations promulgated under Section 9(a)(1)
of the ESA specifically state that "no person may take this
species" outside of certain limited circumstances."8 The ESA
defines "take," as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect" an endangered species, "or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 9
Despite these relaxed regulations, the wolf's reintroduction
created local conflict. In October 1990, a local landowner,
Richard Lee Mann, shot and killed a red wolf.20 Mann claimed he
feared the wolf might threaten his cattle, but the federal
government prosecuted him under Section 17.84(c) of the FWS
regulations promulgated under the ESA.21 After Mann pled
guilty22 to taking a red wolf illegally, opposition to the
reintroduction program crystallized. Opponents of the program
passed two county resolutions opposing the reintroduction
13. Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. I& at 488 n. 1.
17. 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,790. By designating the species as experimental, FWS
retained discretion to "recapture... wolves to replace transmitter or capture collars,
provide routine veterinary care, return animals to the refuge which have strayed
outside its boundaries, or return to captivity animals that are a threat to human
safety or property, or which are severely diseased or injured." Additionally. the wolf
would not be treated as a listed species when outside of wildlife refuge or national
park lands. Id. By contrast, a non-experimental population would have been
stringently protected regardless of its location.
18. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (1998).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
20. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
21. Id.
22. Mann's sentence included 32 hours of community service, part of which he
spent constructing doghouses for captive wolves housed at the Alligator River Wildlife
Refuge. Robert S. Greenberger, Wolves Threaten a Legal Pillar, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
1999, at B 1.
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program.23 The North Carolina State Department of Agriculture
filed a protest against the program, and the state legislature
passed a bill that conflicted with the FWS take provision and set
a far more lenient standard for killing red wolves on private
land. 4 Finally, Mann and a group of other plaintiffs brought an
action challenging the constitutionality -of the FWS take
regulation.
2 5
B. The District Court's Ruling
The district court evaluated whether ESA Section 17.84(c),
the regulation that prevented the taking of red wolves on private
land, was an over-extension of the federal government's
Commerce Clause power. 21 Courts have recently begun to
reevaluate the scope of this power. In 1995, in U.S. v. Lopez, the
Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act as
beyond the federal government's Commerce Clause power,
thereby ending a sixty-year period during which the Supreme
Court never found a regulation unjustified under the Commerce
Clause.27 The Lopez opinion signaled the Court's renewed
willingness to evaluate the validity of federal laws justified under
the Commerce Clause, and set forth a new standard for such
analysis.
Nevertheless, the district court in Gibbs held that Section
17.84(c) survived under the Lopez standard. The court found
that wolves crossed state lines and were followed by interstate
tourists, academics, and scientists.28 On the basis of these
findings, the court concluded that wolves were "things in
interstate commerce" and also had a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce. 29 Accordingly, the district court granted
summary judgment to the federal defendants.
30
23. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (discussing the history, the Court noted that the
expansion of the Commerce Clause "in part... was a recognition of the great
changes that had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country ....
But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce." 514 U.S. at 556).
28. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 536.
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C. The Circuit Court's Ruling
1. The Majority Opinion
The plaintiffs appealed the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which upheld the District Court
by a 2-1 margin. While the Fourth Circuit has been at the
cutting edge of recent conservative trends, 31 Chief Judge
Wilkinson's majority opinion in Gibbs defended, on numerous
alternative grounds, Congress' power to protect endangered
species. The majority found that, even after Lopez, protecting
endangered species was within Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, and buttressed this conclusion by
documenting numerous connections between red wolves and
commerce.
a. Connections Between Red Wolf Protection and Commerce
The court found that red wolves substantially affected
commerce in several ways. It emphasized that wolves drew
numerous out-of-state tourists to "howling" events and were the
subject of numerous scientific studies.32  A revived wolf
population might also renew trade in pelts; the court noted that
a similar trade had resulted from the rejuvenation of endangered
alligator populations.3 In addition, the court suggested that
further study might reveal currently unforeseeable additional
commercial uses for wolves.' Finally, the court found that, by
preying upon wildlife that could destroy agricultural crops,
wolves might confer economic benefits through maintaining
healthy ecosystems.3 5 On the basis of all of these conclusions,
the court found that red wolves substantially affected commerce.
In addition, the court found that the activities regulated by
Section 17.84(c) substantially affected interstate commerce. The
31. See Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Keeps Steering to the Right; Supreme Court
Likes Appeals Panel's Direction but Keeps It from Pushing Too Far, Experts Say, THE
WASH. POST, July 5, 2000, at B1 (noting that numerous decisions involving such
diverse subjects as the Commerce Clause, Miranda rights, standing, and the death
penalty have established the Fourth Circuit as willing to push the Supreme Court in
a more politically conservative direction).
32. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493-94. Under Lopez, Congress may regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, persons or thing in interstate commerce, or
activities that substantially relate to or substantially affect interstate commerce. 514
U.S. at 558-59.
33. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495.
34. Id. at 494.
35. A at 496.
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court described Section 17.84(c) as a regulation protecting an
endangered species from commercially motivated activities,
noting that "farmers take wolves to protect valuable livestock
and crops."36 It then held that the prohibited activity, as well as
the protected resource, could be the nexus connecting a
regulation to commerce, stating, "it is well-settled in Commerce
Clause cases that a regulation can involve the promotion or the
restriction of commercial enterprises and development."37
Accordingly, the court determined that since the "take"
prohibition specifically targeted economic activity, it was valid for
reasons independent of the economic value of the protected
wolves .
38
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that individual
takings lacked economic effect, finding their focus on the
economic impact of individual wolves inconsistent with
Commerce Clause precedent. 39 Instead, the court noted that this
precedent requires analysis of the aggregate effect of individual
activities where regulation of those individual activities is a
necessary component of a broader regulatory scheme.' The
court thus held that its inquiry should focus on the commercial
impact of red wolves as a species and not as isolated
individuals.4 In addition, the court held that the potential
impact of a revived red wolf population, rather than the current
impact of a tiny endangered population, should be considered."
To hold otherwise, the majority noted, would create an absurd
situation in which the ESA's protections grew constitutionally
suspect as the resource to be protected grew more scarce,
effectively excluding the government from protecting those
resources most in need of protection.43 Moreover, the court
placed the takings of red wolves within the broader context of the
entire ESA. The court noted that the entire Act has clear
connections to commerce and represents well-established and
judicially recognized law. Accordingly, the court held it
inappropriate to isolate and strike a particular regulation
promulgated under this wider law.*4
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 497.




44. Id. at 497-98 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) and Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) in support of
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b. Red Wolf Protection and Federalism
After considering the effects of red wolves on commerce, the
court turned to federalism concerns. The majority first rejected
the petitioners' assertion that the regulation infringed upon a
traditional area of state concern.4 It did note, "Lopez and
Morrison rest on the principle that where a federal statute has
only a tenuous connection to commerce and infringes on areas of
traditional state concern, the courts should not hesitate to
exercise their constitutional obligation to hold that the statute
exceeds an enumerated federal power."4 6 While acknowledging
that nineteenth century courts had adhered to the doctrine that
wildlife was state property, the court cited cases replacing this
doctrine with the principle that state regulatory power over
wildlife was shared with, and could be trumped by, federal
authority.4 7 Likewise, the court rejected the petitioner's argument
that the clause impermissibly infringed upon the traditional
state function of regulating land use. While agreeing with the
plaintiffs that land use was a traditional area of state concern,
the court noted that federal wildlife protections restricting land
use, including the ESA itself, were also well established and had
repeatedly been recognized and approved by courts.48
Accordingly, the court held that the protection of wildlife on
private land fell well within the sphere of traditional federal
authority.4 9
The court also concluded that the rationale used to justify
the regulation was not so broad as to obliterate limits on federal
power. In so doing, the court distinguished the Gibbs regulation
from those at issue in Lopez and Morrison.'0 While the "costs of
crime" approach used by Congress to justify the Gun-Free
School Zones Act could have been used to justify almost any
federal criminal or educational statute, and thus would have left
no area of criminal or educational regulation outside the sphere
of federal power, the Gibbs majority found that the rationale
the proposition that since the Supreme Court has previously considered the meaning
of specific sections of the ESA, the constitutionality of the entire act has been
presumed).
45. Id. at 500.
46. Id. at 49 1.
47. Id. at 499 (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172 (1999): Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); and Greer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
48. Id. at 500.
49. Id.
50. Id at 503.
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used to justify Section 17.84(c) was limited to particular
connections between endangered species and commerce. 5' Such
a self-limiting rationale, the court held, was entirely different
from the reasoning unsuccessfully employed by the government
in Lopez and Morrison.52
2. The Dissent
In a short dissent, Judge Luttig disputed both the majority's
willingness to recognize connections between wolves and
interstate commerce and the deference granted by the majority
to Congressional judgment.5 3 In stark contrast to the majority's
statement that "of course natural resource conservation is
economic and commercial,"' Judge Luttig argued that the
assertion of a connection between wolves and interstate
commerce was -exponentially" more speculative than the
connections rejected in Lopez and Morrison.55
Instead, the dissent suggested that killing all forty-one red
wolves living on private property would still have no cognizable
interstate commerce effect.5 6 By finding otherwise, he suggested,
the majority aligned itself with the overly broad interpretations of
commercial activity espoused by the Lopez and Morrison
dissents, and adopted a doctrine that, if accepted by the
Supreme Court, would consign both Lopez and Morrison to
aberration.5 7 In addition, Judge Luttig rejected the notion that
any deference should be granted to Congressional assessment of
the bounds of its own Commerce Clause power.58 Judge Luttig
concluded that a faithful adherence to the principles of Lopez
and Morrison required invalidating Section 17.84(c).59
In response to this dissent, the majority opinion closed with
a strongly worded rejoinder. 60  The majority expressed
consternation at the dissent's unwillingness to acknowledge
connections between natural resources and commerce, and
further criticized the dissent for what the majority perceived as
51. Id at 503-04.
52. Id. at 503.
53. Id. at 506-10.
54. I& at 506.
55. Id. at 507-08.
56. Id. at 507.
57. Id. at 508 ("the expansive view of the Commerce power expressed by the
majority today is closely akin to that separately expressed by Justice Breyer in his
dissent in Lopez and Justice Souter in his dissent in Morrfson... .
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id. at 509-10.
60. Id. at 504-06.
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Judge Luttig's willingness to allow personal distaste for the
regulation to muddle his analysis of the regulation's
constitutionality.6' The majority believed that by mixing inquiries
into Congress' jurisdiction and the quality of Congress'
judgment, the dissent would compromise federalism. The
dissent's excessive assertions of judicial activism could, in an
effort to tinker with the federal-state balance, completely





Gibbs v. Babbitt suggests that the precedents set by the
Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison are compatible with
continued federal protection of endangered species on private
land. The reading of Lopez and Morrison that allows this
interpretation is quite controversial, however, and represents the
most noteworthy aspect of the Gibbs opinion. The Fourth Circuit
dealt with uncertainty about the current state of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by opting for a less revolutionary and less
restrictive reading of Lopez and Morrison. Part II.A. of this Note
assesses the validity of this choice and concludes that Gibbs
employs an acceptable framework for assessing Commerce
Clause challenges to the ESA.
Part II.B. addresses the court's discussion of connections
between endangered species and commerce. While particularly
strong connections between wolves and commerce may have
made this an easy case, they will likely diminish Gibbs'
precedential value. Nevertheless, Gibbs, in combination with a
series of other cases reaching similar results, upholds the
general principle that most endangered species protection is tied
to commerce, and suggests that the ESA's protections will not be
limited to red wolves.
A. The Fourth Circuit's Application of Lopez to the ESA
Lopez and Morrison were undisputedly controlling precedent
in Gibbs,63 but the Fourth Circuit was faced with the difficult
61. Id. ("It cannot be that the mere expression of judicial derision for the efforts
of the democratic branches is enough to discard them.").
62. I& at 505.
63. Id at 490 ("We consider this case under the framework articulated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez ... and United States v, Morrison"); td. at
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task of determining exactly how to apply such precedent. While
the dissent viewed Lopez and Morrison as revolutionary cases
signaling a fundamental change in judicial review of the scope of
Congressional power, the majority treated them as consistent
with the historic development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. This dispute over the true meaning of Lopez and
Morrison is likely to continue, but the Gibbs majority's reading of
these cases appears faithful to the precedents set by the
Supreme Court.
Lopez and Morrison provided mixed signals for the Fourth
Circuit to decipher. On one hand, the Lopez majority took pains
to appear restrained, wording its opinion as though it was only
defining the outer limits of the Commerce Clause's broad grant
of power, limiting its response to an isolated Congressional effort
to overextend federal jurisdiction.' 4 The Lopez decision itself did
not overturn any Supreme Court decisions. In fact, the Court
cited with approval the line of Commerce Clause cases preceding
Lopez.6" Nevertheless, the Court struck down a statute- an
action deeply inconsistent with the pre-Lopez conventional
wisdom that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to do
anything66 - and the dissenting opinions vehemently asserted
that the majority's holding was far more revolutionary than its
unobtrusive language suggested.
6 7
Cases and commentaries following Lopez reflected this
tension between cautious language and broad possibilities. On
one hand, several scholars immediately suggested that the
506 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (noting that Lopez and Morrison provide the framework for
analysis).
64. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (acknowledging that the
Commerce Clause power remained broad); i. at 556-57 (noting continuity between
Lopez and previous Commerce Clause cases, and suggesting that the limits imposed
in Lopez had their roots in the language of those cases); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 729 (1995) ("Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion... indicates little inclination to expand Lopez.").
65. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 556-57 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel. 301
U.S. 1 (1937), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 657 (1941), Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942)).
66. See Merritt, supra note 64, at 674 ("When I graduated from law school in
1980, my classmates and I believed that Congress could regulate any act- no matter
how local- under the Commerce Clause.").
67. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's
opinion abandoned the practice of deferring to Congressional determinations of what
constituted commerce, and in so doing took a major step toward reworking the
balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary); Merritt, supra note 64, at
729 (noting that Justice Breyer "read portions of his dissent from the bench,
evidencing a deep commitment to the ideals expressed there").
2001]
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holding in Lopez would be applied narrowly.6" Likewise, several
circuit court opinions following Lopez came to conclusions
consistent with pre-Lopez Commerce Clause doctrine, and the
Supreme Court's denials of certiorari in several of these cases
suggested acceptance of such results.6 9 On the other hand, some
scholars suggested that Lopez might be the first case in a wave
of general retrenchment of Congress' Commerce Clause power,
and argued that Lopez left the ESA in particular in a sudden
position of vulnerability.7"
Judge Wilkinson's majority opinion in Gibbs placed the
Fourth Circuit firmly behind a narrow reading of the majority
opinions in Morrison and Lopez.7" The Gibbs majority carefully
respected the rules laid down by Lopez and Morrison; the Fourth
Circuit's analysis of connections between the regulated acts and
commerce tracked that of the Supreme Court,72  carefully
weighing each of the federalism concerns raised by the Court.7 3
The Gibbs majority also followed Lopez and Morrison in referring
to the previous line of Commerce Clause cases as though they
stand as binding precedent," suggesting that the majority
68. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 64, at 729 ("the decision is unlikely to herald a
new era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence-); Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 877 (1996) ("1 believe that Lopez will join a growing list of
cases... that appear to be startling changes in direction... but that are
subsequently ignored by the Court.").
69. See Sherry, supra note 68, at 881-82.
70. See, e.g., White. supra note 3: Linehan, supra note 3; Villareal. supra note 3:
J. Blanding Holman, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139
(1995) (arguing that the ESA's take provision may be constitutionally vulnerable).
71. Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion in Brzonkola v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1998), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) provides a detailed discussion of his view of federalism's resurgence,
and provides the philosophical grounding for his support of a limited reading of
Lopez. Wilkinson stressed that. while revived judicial emphasis upon limiting
legislative assertions of power was consistent with the textual mandates of the
Constitution, the resurgence of federalism represented a new form of judicial activism
that should be exercised only with deference and restraint. Id. at 889-98.
72. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483. 490-99 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub norm
Gibbs v. Norton, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001) (analyzing whether the regulated activity fits
within the categories defined by Lopez).
73. Id. at 499-504 (finding that the regulation is consistent with the vision of
federalism espoused in Lopez and Morrison).
74. Id. at 490-505 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1
(1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United
States. 402 US. 146 (1971); Hodel v. Indiana. 452 U.S. 314 (1981); and United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)); see infra text accompanying note 80
(discussing how the holdings in Lopez and Morrison raise doubt about the
precedential value of the previous cases).
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viewed these cases as consistent with the historic development of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The Gibbs majority may have deviated from the Lopez
standard by granting excessive deference to Congress. Lopez and
Morrison clearly suggest that, while Congress may present
evidence that a regulated activity implicates interstate
commerce, defining the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause
power is ultimately a judicial question.7 5 Nevertheless, Lopez
noted that courts historically consider whether Congress had a
"rational basis" for concluding that an activity substantially
affects commerce.7 6 The Morrison Court agreed, stating that "due
respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government
demands that we invalidate a Congressional enactment only
upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds."77 Despite this language, the dissents in
both Lopez and Morrison took the majority to task for
abandoning traditional deference.78 In addition, the fact that
both statutes at issue were invalidated suggests the use of a test
more rigorous than traditional rational basis review.79 This may
indicate that the majority's language in Lopez and Morrison was
little more than lip service and that deference to Congressional
assessment of the Commerce Clause power stands on shaky
ground."0
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the Gibbs court relied on
judicial deference as a partial basis for its opinion. The court
described its standard as "rational basis review with teeth," and
declared that Congressional assessments of which activities
affect commerce could not be lightly swept aside."' Moreover,
Judge Wilkinson stated that once an activity's substantial effect
upon commerce was demonstrated, courts should not question
Congressional judgments about how this effect should be
75. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
77. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
78. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-04 (Souter, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-
55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-04 (Souter, J., dissenting): Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-
55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. See Morrison. 529 U.S. at 637 ("Although a new jurisprudence has not
emerged with any distinctness, it is clear that some congressional conclusions about
obviously substantial, cumulative effects on commerce are being assigned lesser
values than the once-stable doctrine would assign them.").
81. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 2000). cert. denied sub non.
Gibbs v. Norton. 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
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regulated. 2 On its face, the Fourth's Circuit's standard appears
consistent with the levels of deference required by Lopez and
Morrison. However, while the Supreme Court majority could be
accused of paying only lip service to deference doctrine, Judge
Wilkinson's repeated emphasis upon respect for Congressional
judgment suggests a deeper commitment." Thus, in one respect,
the Gibbs majority may have been out of step with the direction
of the current Supreme Court.
Judge Luttig's dissent, however, suggested that the Gibbs
majority had erred far more broadly. While his terse language
leaves some uncertainty about exactly what standard of
Commerce Clause analysis Judge Luttig believed Lopez and
Morrison established,' the general tone of the opinion suggests,
at the very least, that he believed these opinions had
substantially restricted the definition of commerce." Ironically,
in advancing his claim, Judge Luttig agreed with the very Lopez
and Morrison dissents that he had accused the Gibbs majority of
aping. Neither Lopez nor Morrison claimed that the Court's
definition of commerce itself had changed, or that older laws
passed under the pre-Lopez understanding of the commerce
82. Id. at 496. Judge Wilkinson also appears to suggest that the sole appropriate
question is whether the ESA in aggregate is sufficiently connected to commerce, and
that individual regulations promulgated within this broader scheme are the product
of policy judgments and are not subject to review. Id. at 498. This reasoning, if
accepted, would seem to render the ESA immune to as-applied challenges, and
Judge Luttig's dissent opens by vigorously asserting that Section 17.84(c), and not
the entire ESA, should be the focus of the court's inquiry. Id. at 506. Since the
remainder of the majority opinion does approach the case as an as-applied challenge,
however, my analysis does not focus upon this rationale for the majority's holding.
83. Unlike the Lopez majority's opinion, which does not actually contain the
word "deference," Wilkinson mentions deference throughout his opinion. See id.
84. Luttig's opinions on the scope of the commerce power after Lopez are far
more fully developed in his majority opinion in Brzonkola v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affd sub norm United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Judge Luttig placed heavy emphasis upon
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities, arguing that a
conclusion that the regulated activity was not commercial settled the issue and made
further discussion of impacts upon commerce and federalism superfluous. Id. at 836.
This argument suggests that the question of whether an activity is commerce is
distinct from the question of whether it affects commerce, a distinction that could
force courts to rigidly define commerce by tradition and intuition rather than by
assessment of actual economic effects. While the Supreme Court upheld Brzonkola,
Morrison does not appear to mandate such a narrow conception of commercial
activities. Judge Wilkinson, author of the majority opinion in Gibbs, joined Judge
Luttig's majority opinion in Brzonkola, but also wrote a concurring opinion indicating
his preference for a restrained application of the principles contained in Lopez. Id. at
890.
85. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506-10 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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power would now be vulnerable. 6 The suggestion that Commerce
Clause doctrine was actually being reworked came instead from
dissenting opinions that decried this possibility.
8 7
While the real meaning of Lopez and Morrison remains
elusive, the limited interpretation employed by the Gibbs court
should stand. Most importantly, the Gibbs interpretation is
consistent with the Lopez and Morrison opinions. In addition,
there are prudential reasons to expect that further retrenchment
of the federal Commerce Clause power is unlikely. While both
Lopez and Morrison involved the striking down of new statutes,
the Court has yet to use the doctrine to strike a well-established
law. The ESA, nearing its thirtieth birthday and having survived
challenges before the Court,"8 does not seem nearly so likely a
candidate for modification as relatively new legislation like the
Gun-Free School Zones and Violence Against Women Acts. In
addition, both the explicit language of the Lopez and Morrison
opinions and the Court's efforts to portray the cases as
consistent with historic Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggest
an intent to limit the holdings. 9 If these concerns persist, the
version of the Lopez doctrine Judge Wilkinson applied to the ESA
should survive.
B. Gibbs v. Babbitt's Value as Precedent
While the Gibbs court interpreted Lopez in a way the red wolf
could live with, it did not establish that the Commerce Clause
permits protection of all federal endangered species on private
lands. While Gibbs found numerous connections between wolves
and commerce, factual circumstances made establishing those
connections relatively easy. Connections between other species
and commerce may not be so direct. Nevertheless, Gibbs does
stand for the more limited proposition that some species affect
commerce. In combination with several other cases upholding
the ESA against Commerce Clause challenges, Gibbs may add to
a critical mass of opinions suggesting that the ESA will be
immune to Commerce Clause challenges in all its applications.
86. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority's failure to return to what Thomas describes as -the original understanding
of Congress' powers").
87. See id. at 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
89. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(describing his reluctance in joining in even a "limited" holding).
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1. Endangered Species as Commercial Items
Despite Judge Luttig's skepticism, the connections between
red wolves and commerce seem almost irrefutable. The tie
between tourism and the wolves alone might have sustained the
regulation. According to one newspaper, an average of 75 people
per night attend "howling" events hosted by FWS, and crowds of
up to 300 are not uncommon." As another local editorial noted,
the district court ruling "was a reminder that 'eco-tourism' has
potential Down East, where the traditional industries of fishing,
farming, and forestry have declined .... Wild places bring
tourism. And tourists bring dollars."91 Likewise, the possibility of
a renewed trade in pelts, while admittedly speculative, is
speculation with a reasonable basis. The current tiny wolf
population is the possible seed for this future trade, and the
presence of alligator-skin fashion accessories and buffalo
burgers in our modem economy demonstrates that an
endangered population can become an economically exploitable
resource.92
While these connections may be direct, they do not stand by
themselves for a general principle that endangered species
directly impact commerce. There are other species that almost
no one will be interested in hunting, trading, or traveling to see.9 3
Few species are as charismatic as a howling wolf, federal
protection of the Snail Darters and Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Flies of the animal kingdom will require a rationale more general
than direct connections to tourist dollars. While Gibbs offers
several generally applicable rationales, they may not carry quite
the same weight as the wolves' direct connections to the local
economy.
2. Connections Between the Regulated Activity and Commerce
One somewhat more general rationale is the economic
nature of the regulated activity. In discussing the economic
motivations for taking wolves (as opposed to the economic
90. Diane Tennant, Call of the Wild: The Chilling Howl of the Red Wolf Draws
Visitors to Dare County Refuge, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, June 11,
2000, at El0. While this particular story was not before the court, Judge Wilkinson
noted that the plaintiffs had not challenged the defendants' assertion that such
howling events drew out-of-state tourists. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494.
91. Decision Upholds Power to Protect Species at Risk: The Red Wolf Wins in
Court, GREENSBORO NEWS & REcoRD, Jan. 20, 1999. at A10.
92. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495 (discussing the development of trade in alligator
products).
93. White, supra note 3, at 241.
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impacts of the wolves taken), the majority focused upon a type of
connection between endangered species and commerce less
likely to be unique to red wolves and more likely to apply to
other species. The legislative history of the ESA amply
documents concern about the effects of habitat destruction upon
endangered species,9 4 and many challenges to endangered
species protection have involved activities likely to be considered
commercial under the Commerce Clause.9 5 Perhaps the two most
famous modem endangered species controversies- the conflict
between the Tellico Dam and the Snail Darter9 6 and the Pacific
Northwest's battles pitting Spotted Owl protection against timber
harvesting97- have involved activities that would clearly qualify
as commercial. Nevertheless, even if this rationale applies more
generally, it is still possible to imagine numerous scenarios in
which takings of endangered species might be decidedly less
commercial. One commentator, for example, speculated about
whether the Commerce Clause could allow regulations to prevent
wandering children from trampling insect habitat.9 8 Similarly, a
predator like the wolf might be killed out of fear or hatred,
motives that, while perhaps misguided, have little connection to
interstate commerce. While many threats to endangered species
are directly connected with commercial activity, this nexus is
insufficient to connect interstate commerce to all takings.
3. Endangered Species, Scientific Study, and Potential
Commercial Benefits
While also more generally applicable, the connection
between endangered species and scientific study still seems
insufficient to independently sustain regulation. The Gibbs
majority noted that out-of-state scientists studied red wolves and
94. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-85 (1978) (describing the legislative
history of the ESA. While the history cited does not mention commercial activity,
connections between commercial activity and habitat destruction, which the history
suggests was of fundamental concern, are likely to be rather common).
95. See, e.g., id. (dam construction); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (construction of a major hospital); Building Indus. Ass'n
of Superior California v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997) (involving a
challenge brought by members of the construction industry).
96. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 153.
97. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992)
(issuing an injunction halting timber harvesting because of impacts upon the
Northern Spotted Owl).
98. John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REv. 174, 212 (1998).
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that such study was economic in nature.99 Moreover, the court
noted that the connection was quite direct; without wolves, there
would be no such study."°° The Gibbs court was not the first to
cite this rationale; in a pre-Lopez case, the District Court of
Hawaii upheld the ESA's protection of the Palfla, an endangered
Hawaiian bird, in part because "interstate movement of persons,
such as amateur students of nature or professional scientists
who come to a state to observe and study these species...
would otherwise be lost by state inaction."' ° Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, concerned about limiting Congressional power,
might reject the contention that an activity affects interstate
commerce merely because it affects something studied.
Scientists can, after all, study just about anything. The fact of
study alone, without reference to possible economic benefits
arising from such studies, may not be enough to connect an
activity to interstate commerce. Thus, this justification's
potentially over-broad application may be its undoing.
The Gibbs court did, however, note that the study of wolves
might provide such economic benefits. 2 In so doing, the court
offered a rationale that could be extended to all endangered
species. First, the court noted that the study of wolves could
provide economically valuable information about ecosystems.1
3
This claim could be made about any endangered species.
Second, the court noted that the study of wolves could reveal
currently unforeseeable uses for the wolves, and noted that
many discoveries in. modem medicine originate with the study of
plants and animals.1°4 This latter rationale is also extremely
broad in its application, since predicting which species will
become valuable is difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the only way
to ensure the possibility of future discoveries may be to protect
all species. '
99. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 484, 494 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom
Gibbs v. Norton, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2000).
100. Id. at 492.
101. Palfla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995
(D. Haw. 1979).
102. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (noting that it is certain that biodiversity overall has great value even if the
contribution of individual species to that value is unknown). But see Nagle, supra
note 98, at 207 (suggesting that we can discern that some species will have more
potential for impacts upon commerce than others).
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The potential reach of this rationale has already been
illustrated by the role it played in protecting the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly. In National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt,'° Judge Wald, of the D.C. Circuit, adopted exactly this
position. Faced with a Commerce Clause challenge to the listing
of an obscure fly endemic to a tiny area of southern California,
Judge Wald cited the value of biodiversity as a cognizable
connection between the ESA and interstate commerce. 0 7 In
addition, she emphasized that the potential economic value of
biodiversity is immense. Medical discoveries involving
endangered species have the potential to generate lucrative
payoffs, and pharmaceutical companies have demonstrated their
willingness to invest major sums of money in "bioprospecting."
0 8
Nevertheless, the protection of every endangered species
based upon speculative connections to commerce has proved too
tenuous for some judges. In National Ass'n of Home Builders, for
example, both Judge Henderson, who concurred in Judge Wald's
judgment for other reasons, and Judge Sentelle, in his dissent,
found this rationale overbroad.1 0 Other judges may also find
such connections to commerce overly speculative or attenuated,
especially given that "[elfforts to identify plants and animals with
medicinal uses have identified far more useless species than
helpful ones.""' If the connections between commerce and gun
possession in schools (Lopez) or gender-motivated violence
(Morrison) were insufficient, and if the Court is fundamentally
concerned with ensuring that laws are justified by limited
rationales, an unlikely connection between commerce and an
individual species may be insufficient to sustain a protective
regulation.
4. Ecosystem Benefits and Commerce
In noting the ecosystem benefits the wolf might provide,
Judge Wilkinson offered perhaps the strongest of the Gibbs
majority's broader justifications for a connection between the
Commerce Clause and endangered species. This rationale's
106. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
107. Nat'lAss'nofHomeBuilders, 130 F.3d at 1052-54.
108. White, supra note 3, at 244-45; see also Nagle, supra note 98, at 185 (noting
the value of endangered species to medical and agricultural research).
109. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring)
("I do not see how we can say that the protection of an endangered species has any
effect on interstate commerce (much less a substantial one) by virtue of an uncertain
potential medical or economic value.").
110. Nagle, supra note 98, at 186.
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applicability could extend far beyond red wolves. Almost any
species functions within interdependent ecosystems. Each may
perform, either as predator or prey, functions affecting the
availability of natural resources, and thus may impact
commerce. Moreover, the holdings in both Gibbs and National
Ass'n of Home Builders suggest that the scientific principle that
ecologically diverse ecosystems are more stable and healthy and,
therefore, potentially more economically useful, has achieved
some acceptance among judges."'
Nevertheless, this rationale has its skeptics. Just as most
species lack potential medicinal value, many species will not
affect the economic utility of the ecosystems they inhabit.'
2
Moreover, some entire ecosystems arguably may have little
commercial value."3 Finally, the ecosystem argument employs a
rather broad rationale. Endangered species are not the only
things that affect ecosystems; a court adopting this argument
might be required to allow federal regulation of anything
affecting ecosystems. The Gibbs court seemed prepared to do
just this. It flatly stated, "natural resource conservation is
economic and commercial,"" 4 suggesting that permitting federal
regulation of all natural resources under the Commerce Clause
might be entirely appropriate. Given the current Supreme
Court's concerns with enumerated, limited power, however, such
a broad construction of commerce, while entirely intuitive to
many environmentalists, might not survive judicial scrutiny.
5. The Aggregate Effect
This analysis has focused on the independent viability of the
arguments used by the Gibbs court. This court did not, however,
consider these arguments in isolation, and their cumulative
weight should carry more precedential power. Connections
among commerce and potential future resource use, current
academic study, tourism or other current economic uses,
potential medical, agricultural, or other yet-to-be-discovered
uses, and ecosystem impacts all might be independently
insufficient to sustain a regulation. Nevertheless, the cumulative
weight of all of these actual or potential uses could reasonably
111. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 484, 496 (4th Cir. 2000). cert. denied sub
norr. Gibbs v. Norton, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2000); Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d
at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring).
112. Nagle, supra note 98, at 187.
113. Id.
114. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506.
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establish a sufficient connection to commerce. Likewise, a court
might note that while some of the activities prohibited by the
ESA are not commercially motivated, most are. While none of
these rationales alone may be sufficient to sustain the ESA's
takings clause in all instances, their aggregate effect is to
demonstrate that, in one or more ways, endangered species
protection will almost always be a commercial activity.
This conclusion is borne out by the recent history of ESA
cases. As the Gibbs majority noted, courts have consistently
allowed endangered species protection under the Commerce
Clause."' Individually, none of these cases appears to stand for
the general principle that the Commerce Clause will always
permit the regulation of takings under the ESA. Gibbs, for
example, involved an unusually charismatic animal with an
active fan following. Likewise, National Ass'n of Home Builders
involved a regulated activity that was clearly commercial and,
moreover, resulted in three separate opinions, with only the
ecosystem impacts rationale garnering a majority. Building
Industry Ass'n of Superior California most clearly states that all
endangered species protection is permitted under the Commerce
Clause, but does so largely on the basis of general citations to
precedent and does not otherwise make clear why this is the
case."' Nevertheless, if these cases individually do not provide
principles to squelch all Commerce Clause challenges to the
ESA, their collective weight, combined with the ESA's thirty-year
history, may create enough critical mass of precedent to ensure
that the ESA will survive intact.
CONCLUSION
By asserting limits upon Congress' Commerce Clause
powers, the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison
cast doubt upon broad areas of federal legislation, including the
Endangered Species Act's take provision.' The Fourth Circuit's
holding in Gibbs v. Babbitt provides strong rationales for
upholding the take provision in the face of such doubts. While
the reach of Lopez and Morrison remain in dispute, the majority
opinion in Gibbs appears faithful to the reasoning of those cases,
115. Id. at 496 (citing United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996);
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d 1041; Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior
California v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997); and Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of
Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd. 639 F.2d 495
(9thCir. 1981)).
116. Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior California v. Babbitt. 979 F. Supp. 893,
907 (D.D.C. 1997).
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demonstrating how the holdings of Lopez and Morrison are
compatible with continued federal protection of endangered
species. Thus, the decision should stand.
The actual holding of Gibbs may be limited; connections
between red wolves and interstate commerce were quite direct,
and a finding that the Commerce Clause allows protection of
wolves does not indicate that the Commerce Clause allows
protection of all endangered species. Nevertheless, the rationales
employed to allow protection have broad applicability, especially
when considered in aggregate, and may carry enough weight to
sustain the ESA against all Commerce Clause challenges.
Moreover, Gibbs stands with other post-Lopez decisions in
upholding regulations promulgated under the ESA take clause
against constitutional challenge. In combination with these other
cases, Gibbs suggests that the Commerce Clause power may still
allow Congress to regulate the taking of all endangered species.
